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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3, having been referred to that Court by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the District Court err in denying the defense's motion for mistrial despite finding the 
prosecutor inappropriately argued to the jury regarding suppression issues. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rulings on motions for mistrial are reviewed for abuse of discretion and this standard is met 
only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its 
absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant. For purposes of 
determining whether a mistrial should have been granted, our overriding concern is that defendant 
received a fair trial. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
Defendant objected to the improper argument regarding suppression issues during the 
prosecutor's closing argument, see Record at 204, p. 181, and moved for a mistrial at the conclusion 
of the closing argument, which motion the district court denied, finding that although the 
prosecutor's argument was inappropriate, it did not justify declaring a mistrial. See Record at 204, 
pp. 183-189. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Appellant was convicted at jury trial of unlawful possession of methamphetamine 
with intent to distribute, a first-degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A 
misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 5 to life in prison on the felony, with sentence on the 
misdemeanor stayed. See Judgment, R. at 192-195. 
Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine and paraphernalia found 
in the car driven by the Defendant as well as at the place where he resided, and the Court suppressed 
the evidence as having been obtained via an unconstitutional search of the residence based on the 
fact there was no warrant and no consent for the search thereof, but did not suppress the evidence 
from the car based on the finding that the search was incident to arrest and part of an inventory 
search. See Record at 67-72, 95-96, 99-101, 106-107, and 206. At trial, the drug evidence only 
from the car was presented, but in his closing argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury as follows: 
Sometimes juries get - they get caught up in, ah, suppression issues and things like 
that when they get back to deliberate, I just want to tell you that - that those issues, 
ah, have already been resolved in the case. In other words, -
See Record at 204, p. 180-181. Defense counsel then objected and the Court sustained the objection. 
M a t 181. 
The Defense moved for a mistrial at the conclusion of the closing argument, which motion 
the district court denied, finding that although the prosecutor's argument was inappropriate, it did 
not justify declaring a mistrial. See Record at 204, pp. 183-189. 
The prosecution's evidence at trial was that the Defendant had been seen driving alone in a 
vehicle with no license plates, had been pulled over, and that approximately 54 grams of 
methamphetamine was found in a speaker hole in the driver's side door panel, along with a small 
set of scales and plastic baggies. See Record at 204, pp. 58-62, 66-78, 90-98. 
The Defense elicited testimony that while the Defendant owned and was pulled over while 
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driving the vehicle in question, that the vehicle had only been driven by the Defendant for a few 
hours, starting the very day he was arrested, and that the Defendant and a friend had just put a new 
engine in it, prior to which it had been inoperable and sitting in a parking lot, broken down and 
unlocked (it had no door key), and thus that there was reasonable doubt as to whether the contraband 
may have been placed or stored in the truck by someone other than the Defendant. Id. at pp. 131-
138, 146-150. There was no fingerprint evidence linking the contraband to the Defendant. Id. at pp. 
98-99. There were no witnesses which stated that the Defendant had ever held, possessed on his 
person, sold, or used the methamphetamine found in the speaker hole in the car. Id., passim. 
The Defense's argument for mistrial was that it was prosecutorial misconduct for the 
prosecutor to tell the jury that there were suppression issues in the case and that they had been 
resolved; and that the prosecutor, in mentioning that there were suppression issues in the case, and 
that those had been resolved, gives a message to the jury that there is other incriminating evidence 
which he wasn't able to present. Id. at p. 183. 
The prosecutor countered that the purpose of the statements was simply to explain that issues 
regarding how the search of the car was conducted were not part of what the jury was to consider and 
decide. Id. at pp. 186-188, 
The dislrict court agreed that it was inappropriate for the prosecutor to make these statements. 
Id. at p. 189. The district court, in its questioning of defense counsel after the motion was made, 
pressed the point that in fact there had been suppression issues in the case and that evidence had in 
fact been suppressed, and thus that the prosecutor had not spoken untruthfully. Id. at p. 185. 
However, the district court then determined that there was not anything in the statements from 
which the jury would have inferred that there was other evidence that they were not told about and 
that this was not the purpose of the statements; and thus ruled that they did not rise to the level that 
required a mistrial. Id. dtp. 189. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The prosecutor's inappropriate statements, that there were suppression issues in the case that 
have already been decided, tainted the trial with the information that there existed other 
incriminating evidence which had been suppressed and thus which the jury was not allowed to hear, 
thus depriving the Defendant of his right to a fair trial. 
ARGUMENTS 
Rulings on motions for mistrial are reviewed for abuse of discretion and this standard is met 
only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its 
absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant. For purposes of 
determining whether a mistrial should have been granted, our overriding concern is that defendant 
received a fair trial. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998) 
Utah's appellate courts have made clear that the use of evidence at trial which was subject 
to suppression, due to its having been obtained via an unconstitutional search, requires reversal of 
conviction unless reviewing court sincerely believes that error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App.1995). 
Courts from other states have handled situations with the unique fact pattern of this case in 
which it is the prosecutor rather than a witness who makes the impermissible revelation. They have 
found, for example, that where a suppression of evidence is ordered by the court due to an improper 
search and seizure, neither the items discovered as a result of the search nor testimony or remarks 
relating thereto is admissible in evidence. See, e.g., Walton v. State, 431 S.W.2d 462 (Ark. App. 
1968). A prosecuting attorneys making remarks relating to suppression of evidence falls within this 
rule of law and should be considered clearly prejudicial. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 513 S.W.2d 496 
(Ark. App. 1974); Robinson v. State, 623 S.W.2d 534, 534-536 (Ark. App. 1981). 
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The prosecutor's inappropriate statements, that there were suppression issues in the case that 
have already been decided, tainted the trial with the information that there existed other 
incriminating evidence which had been suppressed and thus which the jury was not allowed to hear, 
thus depriving the Defendant of his right to a fair trial. 
The district court's analysis of the impact of the statements was flawed. First, it determined 
that there was not anything in the statements from which the jury would have inferred that there was 
other evidence that they were not told about. To the contrary, it can objectively and reasonably be 
inferred from the prosecutor's statements, that there were suppression issues where had already been 
decided, that there was evidence not presented at trial which had been suppressed. It may be true 
that the district court did not infer this, and furthermore the district court may have itself felt the 
prosecutor's purpose was pure, but it does not follow that jurors could not reasonably make very 
prejudicial inferences from the prosecutor's comments, regardless; it is imminently reasonable to 
infer from the statement that there were suppression issues in this case, that evidence had been 
suppressed; and evidence which is suppressed is evidence which is suppressed from presentation at 
trial. It is difficult to understand how these are not reasonable inferences. They are hardly even 
inferences at all, but are rather simply obvious meanings taken from the prosecutor's statements. 
If they are inference, however, they are certainly reasonable inferences. 
Indeed the district court, in his questioning of defense counsel after the motion was made, 
presses the point that in fact there had been suppression issues in the case and that evidence had in 
fact been suppressed, and thus that the prosecutor had not spoken untruthfully. The district court 
then, however, decided that inferring this truth was unreasonable. These are contradictory lines of 
reasoning and this contradiction exposes the error of the district court's analysis. 
Since the district court's decision not to declare a mistrial was based upon its erroneous 
determination that no reasonable inference could be taken from the prosecutor's statement that there 
was additional incriminating evidence suppressed and not presented at trial, his decision was an 
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abuse of discretion and warrants reversal. 
The Defendant was deprived of a fair trial when the jury was tainted with the prosecutor's 
statements which revealed, or at least reasonably implied, that additional incriminating evidence 
existed but had been suppressed. 
The prosecution's evidence at trial was that the Defendant had been seen driving alone in a 
vehicle with no license plates, had been pulled over, and that approximately 54 grams of 
methamphetamine was found in a speaker hole in the driver's side door panel, along with a small 
set of scales and plastic baggies. The Defense elicited testimony that while the Defendant owned 
and was pulled over while driving the vehicle in question, that the vehicle had only been driven by 
the Defendant for a few hours, starting the very day he was arrested, and that the Defendant and a 
friend had just put a new engine in it, prior to which it had been inoperable and sitting in a parking 
lot, broken down and unlocked (it had no door key), and thus that there was reasonable doubt as to 
whether the contraband may have been placed or stored in the truck by someone other than the 
Defendant. There was no fingerprint evidence linking the contraband to the Defendant. The 
prosecutor's statement, and the revelation accomplished thereby that additional incriminating 
evidence existed but had been suppressed, very likely could have tipped the jury against finding 
reasonable doubt based upon the Defense's evidence regarding the status of the car, coupled with 
the lack of fingerprint evidence in the case and lack of witnesses stating that the Defendant had ever 
held, possessed on his person, sold, or used the methamphetamine found in the speaker hole in the 
car. This was not a case with overwhelming evidence against the Defendant, in which it can be 
reasonably concluded that the jury would have convicted regardless of the prosecutor's statement. 
This is an unusual case; there is case law addressing a defendant's right to a new trial when 
suppressed evidence is admitted. See, e.g., State v. Movant, 574 A.2d 502 (N.J. Super. 1990) (new 
trial warranted based on admission of evidence which had been suppressed). In this case, however, 
it was not that the suppressed evidence was admitted in the evidence phase of the trial; instead, it was 
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alluded to by the prosecutor in closing argument. While it will likely be argued by the appellee that 
this distinction mitigates in its favor, the opposite is true; when a prosecutor refers to suppressed 
evidence in closing, there is no chance for cross-examination, no chance to rebut with contradictory 
evidence; rather, it is simply placed into the jury's domain, without opportunity to refute and without 
a meaningfull means to "unring the bell." Thus, if the introduction of suppressed evidence warrants 
a new trial, then aprosecutor's revelation that suppressed evidence exists warrants a new trial all-the-
more. Indeed, it is appropriate to hold an even higher standard, against the State, in the scenario in 
the instant case, where it is the prosecutor- a lawyer fully cognizant of appropriate legal restrictions 
on what can and cannot be presented to the jury - makes the mistake, as opposed to a lay witness 
(unschooled in evidentiary restrictions) letting an inappropriate comment slip in response to a 
question. 
Conviction obtained at trial wherein information regarding evidence which, under 
constitutional scrutiny, is appropriately suppressed, should be reversed, unless the reviewing court 
sincerely believes that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 
916 (Utah App. 1995). Given the prosecutor's inappropriate comments regarding suppression, and 
given the modest evidence presented by the State, the lack of fingerprint or corroborating witness 
testimony, and the plausible issues raised by the defense, this is a conviction that should be reversed. 
Where a suppression of evidence is ordered by the court due to an improper search and seizure, 
neither the items discovered as a result of the search nor testimony or remarks relating thereto should 
be introduced into what the pure vessel of the trial jury, and the prosecuting attorney's remarks 
relating to suppression of evidence should be considered to fall within this rule and should be 
considered clearly prejudicial. See, e.g., Walton v. State, 431 S.W.2d462(Ark. App. 1968); Nelson 
v. State, 513 S.W.2d496 (Ark. App. 1974); Robinson v. State, 623 S.W.2d 534, 534-536 (Ark. App. 
1981). 
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CONCLUSION 
A mistrial should have been declared. The conviction should be reversed. 
Dated this Jjj? day of tj [A 20 Q^) 
Randall) 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Judgment, Commitment and Sentence 
SCOTT F. GARRETT (#8687) 
Iron County Attorney 
82 North 100 East, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435)865-5310 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
ROBERT JAMES SHERRY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
) JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, 
AND COMMITMENT 
1 Criminal No. 041500345 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The Defendant, ROBERT JAMES SHERRY, having been convicted pursuant to a jury trial 
of the offenses of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE, a First-Degree Felony; and POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class 
A Misdemeanor; on March 3, 2005, in Parowan, Utah, and the Court having entered the verdicts of 
guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report, and after 
said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter having come on for 
sentencing on April 26, 2005, and the Defendant, ROBERT JAMES SHERRY, having appeared 
before the Court in person, together with his attorney of record James K. Slavens, and the State of 
Utah having appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott F. Garrett, and the Court having 
MAY 0 3 2005 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COUNTY 
DEPUTY CLERK , 
Of f r 
reviewed the presentence investigation report and the file in detail, and having further heard 
statements from all parties and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, ROBERT 
JAMES SHERRY, has been convicted of the offenses of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a First-Degree Felony; and 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class A Misdemeanor; and the Court having 
asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be 
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is 
adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant, ROBERT 
JAMES SHERRY, and pursuant to his conviction of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a First-Degree Felony, is hereby 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a period of five (5) years to life, and 
the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State Department of Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no fine shall be imposed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the imposition of sentence on the Defendant's conviction 
of POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class A Misdemeanor, shall be stayed. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, ROBERT JAMES SHERRY, shall be 
exposed to substance abuse treatment at the Utah State Prison; moreover, any condition of parole 
shall include a substance abuse treatment program. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, ROBERT JAMES SHERRY, 
and deliver him to the Utah State Department of Corrections in Draper, Utah, there to be kept 
and confined in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
DATED this ^ — day of May, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
EfHa }*t J. PHILIP 
Di&rict C o u ^ S ^ T ^ ' 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the original 
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Robert James Sherry. 
Criminal No. 041500345, now on file and of record in my office. 
OH 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah. 
this 
1st / day of May, 2005. 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
' / / • ^ ^ , _ y -. 
/f/'^iK, test: 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
District Court Clerk 
-v\5 
* * * * * • * * ' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, on 
Z • day of Qhk this ntUAs , 2005, to the following, to wit: 
Mr. James K. Slavens 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
]&A(fU. 
Assistant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certified that on the /Jr day of A^l f 200 3 I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be served via mailing by US Mail first class postage prepaid to: 
Assistant Attorneys General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
